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1. CLOSE CORPORATION ACT
For a number of years attorneys have recognized the fact that
closely held corporations simply cannot operate effectively within the
framework of general corporation statutes, which, for the most part,
were tailored to fit the publicly-held corporation. Accordingly, resort has
been made to such devices as pre-incorporation agreements, special
charter and by-law provisions, share transfer restrictions, shareholders'
agreements, voting trusts, irrevocable proxies, and long-term employ-
ment contracts-all with the central purpose of keeping the close corpo-
ration close.' With few exceptions, however, legislatures and courts
have failed to recognize the differences between publicly-held and close
corporations. Therefore, the Florida Legislature is to be complimented
for its adoption of a separate statute2 tailored to the special character-
istics of the close corporation. The newly adopted statute is not compre-
hensive. It does not meet all of the needs of the close corporation. But
it is a welcome step in the right direction.
The statute's application is permissive and not mandatory3 It de-
fines a "close corporation" as a "corporation for profit whose shares of
stock are not generally traded in the markets maintained by securities
dealers or brokers."4
A few years ago a North Carolina case5 attracted national attention
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. See generally 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORAnONS (1958).
2. FLA. STAT. § 608.0100 (1963).
3. The act "shall have no application to any close corporation in existence on September 1,
1963, unless such previously existing close corporation shall elect to bring itself within the
provisions of this act by written consent of the owners of a majority of the voting stock."
FLA. STAT. § 608.0100(1) (1963).
4. FLA. STAT. § 608.0100(2) (1963).
5. Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d 677 (1955), re-
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by reason of its square holding that in order for a corporation to have
legal existence there must be a minimum of three shareholders at all
times. In that case the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that
when less than three persons acquired all the shares, the corporation
became "dormant" and no longer acted as a corporation. Among other
things, this holding enabled creditors and other plaintiffs to disregard
the corporate entity and hold shareholders individually liable in all
one-man and two-man corporate situations. The new Florida Close
Corporation Act expressly negatives this possibility by providing as
follows:
The existence of a corporation, hereafter or heretofore formed
under the laws of this State, shall in no respect be deemed im-
paired by the acquisition of all the shares of stock of such corpo-
ration by one person or by two persons, nor shall the corporation,
by such acquisition, be deemed not to possess any managerial
boards or bodies or any capacities, powers or authority which it
would have possessed with three or more stockholders, nor shall
the corporation, upon such acquisition, be deemed to have be-
come dormant, inactive or incapable of acting as a corporation.8
The new statute contains numerous other ameliorating features of
assistance in solving the special problems of the close corporation. It
provides, for example, that the articles of incorporation may provide for
the corporation to be managed by the stockholders rather than by a
board of directors. It permits the stockholders to take action by written
consent without a meeting. It permits stockholders' agreements govern-
ing management and other matters.
But perhaps its most significant provision allows the stockholders
"at any time [to] remove [directors], with or without cause. . . ."' This
new provision reflects the seriousness of a problem that existed prior to
its enactment-one that was brought into sharp focus in the Florida
case of Frank v. Anthony.8 P, the president of a corporation, became its
sole shareholder and director upon its organization and the resignation
of two "dummy" incorporators and directors. As the remaining director,
P designated A and B to fill the vacancies created on the board.' The
directors then adopted a resolution authorizing only A and B to draw
checks on the corporate bank account. Later, at a special but informal
meeting of the board, P was removed as president by a 2-1 vote. That
same day P called a special stockholders' meeting, and, as sole stock-
inanded on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956). The North Carolina code was
subsequently amended to provide that limited liability is not lost "even if all the shares are
owned by one person." N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-53(e) (1960).
6. FLA. STAT. § 608.0101(1) (1963).
7. FLa. STAT. § 608.0106 (1963).
8. 107 So.2d 136 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
9. This procedure is required by FLA. STAT. § 608.08(2) (1963).
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holder, elected himself and two other persons as directors. At this time
there was no charter or by-law provision for the removal of directors,
but P voted to amend the by-laws to authorize removal without cause.
The "new board" then authorized only P to draw checks on the corporate
bank account. P then sought a declaratory decree declaring him to be
the president, and an injunction restraining A and B from acting as
directors and requiring the bank to honor only P's signature on the
corporation's checking account. The relief sought was denied.1" The deci-
sion serves as a warning of the dangers to majority shareholders in close
corporations: In practical effect, even lock, stock and barrel ownership
may not equal control. The provision in the new act permitting removal
of directors by the stockholders with or without cause avoids many
pitfalls.
B. Other Corporate Legislation.
1. 'MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION
The corporate code was amended to allow a Florida corporation
to merge or consolidate with corporations organized under any other
"territory, possession or jurisdiction of the United States ... ,"1 Prior
to this amendment only the word "state" had appeared in the section,
thus making unclear the power to merge with other than corporations
organized under the laws of one of the 50 states.
2. STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
A new section was added to the code authorizing corporations to
reimburse directors or officers for expenses sustained in defense of a
stockholder's derivative action "except in relation to matters as to which
such director or officer was adjudged to have been guilty of negligence
or misconduct in the performance of his duty to the corporation."' 2
Prior to the adoption of this amendment, there was a common-law con-
flict as to whether corporate directors and officers were entitled to in-
demnification or reimbursement for their reasonable expenses incurred
in defending a shareholder's derivative suit for alleged breach of official
duty, in which they were vindicated of charges of wrongdoing.
A corollary section now provides that a successful plaintiff in a
shareholder's derivative action may be awarded "the reasonable expenses
10. The suggestion might be advanced that P, at the special meeting of shareholders,
could have amended the bylaws to increase the number of directors and thus regained the
balance of voting power by "loading" the board. But even this avenue was not open to
him, for the corporate code provides: "Vacancies . . . shall be filled .. .by the directors
remaining in office. . . .An increase in the number of directors shall create vacancies for
the purpose of this section. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 608.08(2) (1963).
11. FLA. STAT. § 608.21(1) (1963).
12. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.13(14)-(15) (1963).
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of maintaining the action, including reasonable attorney's fees. . .. ""
Inasmuch as the derivative suit is actually a mandatory class action for
the benefit of the corporation and other shareholders, the successful
plaintiff who carries the burden of the expense of litigation is certainly
entitled to such an award. But that is not the whole story. Another new
section requires plaintiffs in shareholder's derivative actions to give
security for the estimated expenses of the defendants, unless the plain-
tiff holds five per cent or more of the outstanding shares, or unless his
shares have a market value in excess of $50,000.'4 This section is con-
troversial. Inspired by a similar statutory provision enacted by the New
York legislature,' 5 its obvious purpose is to discourage "strike" or
nuisance actions. The provision has been vigorously attacked, however,
on the ground that it denies to the small investor any civil remedy for
breach of fiduciary duties on the part of those persons entrusted with
the management and direction of the corporation. 6
An additional change involves codification of the "contemporaneous
ownership" rule as a condition precedent to the bringing of a share-
holder's derivative action. In short, the plaintiff must be a stockholder
"at the time of bringing the action" and must show that he had been
a stockholder "at the time of the transaction of which he complains, or
that his interest devolved upon him by operation of law."'" Prior to
this amendment, the Florida common law had followed this view," 8
although a conflict still exists in other jurisdictions.
Finally, the new amendments, in accord with common-law prin-
ciples on shareholder's derivative actions, provide that the complaint
"must set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure
the initiation of such action by the board of directors of such corpora-
tion or the reasons for not having made such effort. . . ,, o and that
no shareholder's derivative action may be "discontinued, compromised
or settled without the approval of the court having jurisdiction of the
action."2 In view of a legion of common-law decisions in line with
13. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(5) (1963).
14. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(4) (1963). The amount of the security may be increased or
reduced from time to time in the discretion of the court "upon showing that the security
provided has or may become inadequate or excessive." Ibid.
15. N.Y. GEN. CoaR. LAW § 64 (1950).
16. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32
CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944).
17. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(1) (1963).
18. News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So.2d 741 (1941).
19. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(2) (1963). See Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale Co., 107
Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932), where it was held that a request by the shareholder was not
necessary to the maintenance of the action when such a request "would not have served any
useful purpose."
20. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(3) (1963). See Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945),
which expressed the principle now codified in FLA. STAT. § 608.131(3) (1963).
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these last points, one may not reasonably quarrel with the new legisla-
tion.
Other changes adopted at the 1963 session of the Florida legisla-
ture include: (1) a provision that a corporation shall file with the
secretary of state a written acceptance of the appointment of its resident
agent; 2 ' (2) a provision for increase in the schedule of fees for the
capital stock tax;22 (3) a provision permitting the secretary of state
to destroy charters of dissolved corporations after photographing such
charters, and permitting such photographs to be admissible as evidence
as if they were the original charters; 2" (4) a provision that upon volun-
tary dissolution of a corporation, an affidavit must be filed with the
secretary of state that all taxes have been paid by the corporation; 2
(5) a provision specifying the effective dates of corporate existence,
amendments to the articles of incorporation, and voluntary dissolution
when not otherwise specified; 2" (6) a provision prescribing procedure
for reincorporation of non-profit. corporations whose charters were ap-
proved by a circuit judge or granted by the legislature prior to September
1, 1959.26
C. Recent Cases
1. SEPARATE ENTITY PRIVILEGE
With a fair degree of consistency courts have adhered to the doc-
trine that the separate corporate entity privilege will not be disregarded
unless that privilege has been abused. The fact that the corporation
is organized for the avowed purpose of escaping personal liability does
not of itself spell abuse of the privilege. Thus, in a recent Florida
case it was held that the Florida Industrial Commission had no jurisdic-
tion to disregard legal entities and hold another corporation and part-
nership jointly liable with a corporate employer for payment of com-
pensation benefits on the theory that the partnership and corporations
were in fact one and not three separate legal entities. In discussing the
nature of the corporate entity, the court had this to say:
Those who utilize the laws of this state in order to do business
in the corporate form have every right to rely on the rules
of law which protect them against personal liability unless it
be shown that the corporation is formed or used for some
illegal, fraudulent or other unjust purpose which justifies
piercing the corporate veil. This is the reason for the rule
21. FLA. STAT. § 608.27(1) (1963). See also FiA. STAT. § 47.35 (1963).
22. FLA. STAT. § 608.33 (1963). See also FLA. STAT. § 608.32(1) (1963).
23. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.36(3)-(4) (1963).
24. FLA. STAT. § 608.27(1) (1963).
25. FLA. STAT. § 608.041 (1963).
26. FLA. STAT. § 617.012 (1963).
27. Roberts Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So.2d 718 (Fla. 1963).
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stated in all Florida cases, that the courts are reluctant to
pierce the corporate veil and will do so only in a court of
competent jurisdiction, after notice to and full opportunity
to be heard by all parties, and upon showing of cause which
necessitates the corporate entity being disregarded in order to
prevent some injustice.28
Although a Florida statute prohibits the charging of usurious rates
of interest,29 the statute expressly excludes loans to corporate borrowers.
It has been held that the usury laws may not be frustrated by the use
of a corporate shell to cloak a loan actually made to an individual bor-
rower.80 In that case, however, there was a preponderance of evidence
to the effect that the corporation had been formed at the insistence of
the lenders as a prerequisite to their making of the loan and as a sham
contrivance to defeat the usury statutes applicable only to loans to
individuals. In a more recent case, where the corporate borrower had
been in existence for three years and had owned mortgaged property for
six months prior to applying for the 'loan on the property, the court
found that the loan was made to the corporation and rejected the argu-
ment that the corporate entity privilege had been abused.8
When officers or agents of a corporation, acting within the scope of
their authority, engage in fraudulent practices, it is not necessary to
pierce the corporate veil in order to establish liability. This principle
was correctly applied in a case in which officers misrepresented facts
to a purchaser. The court observed that "a corporation is vicariously
liable for fraud and misrepresentation practiced by its directors or agents
within the scope of their employment. A corollary to this rule is that
said directors and agents are also liable individually.""2
2. PROHIBITED TRANSFERS BY CORPORATION
Three recent cases involved a statute3 prohibiting certain transfers
by a financially embarrassed corporation. That statute prohibits a cor-
poration which has refused to pay any of its notes or other obligations
when due from transferring any of its property to any of its officers,
directors or stockholders for the payment of any debt or upon any
other consideration than the full value of the property paid in cash.
The statute further provides that no conveyance by any such corpora-
tion shall be valid if made when it is insolvent or when insolvency is
imminent, with the intent of giving a preference to any particular
creditor. Directors or officers who violate the section may be held per-
28. Id. at 721.
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.02-.03 (1963).
30. Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., 111 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
31. Rosenhouse v. Kirnbrig, 147 So.2d 354 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
32. Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So.2d 876, 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
33. FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1963).
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sonally liable to the creditors and stockholders of their corporation to
the full extent of any loss sustained on account of the violation.
In the first 4 of the three cases involving section 608.55, P Corpora-
tion, between April 15 and September 8, sold goods, wares and mer-
chandise to D Corporation. On September 27 of the same year D
Corporation became insolvent. Thereafter D Corporation made payments
to a bank to which it had assigned all its accounts receivable prior to
insolvency as collateral security for a loan. Additionally, C, an officer
of D Corporation, had paid another corporate creditor from his per-
sonal funds. P Corporation sought to hold the officers and directors of
D Corporation personally liable to the extent of these payments.
With respect to the payments to the bank, the court held that
since the "transfer" was completed at the time of the assignment of
the accounts receivable, it was not an invalid preferential payment
within the meaning of the statute. With respect to the payment from
the officer's personal funds, inasmuch as there was no diminution of
the corporate assets, it was held that no preferential payment had been
made. The court's reasoning is sound on both counts.
Another case3 involving this statute presented the question of
whether an agreement at the time of the creation of an obligation that
it will be secured by a mortgage or security deed, and to be followed
by the execution and delivery of the mortgage or security deed at some
later date, places the obligation in the category of an antecedent debt
so as to invalidate the security as a preferential payment within the
meaning of the statute.
The facts of the case reveal that B, an officer of D Corporation,
made a number of loans to that corporation. Subsequently, he received
from D Corporation a blanket mortgage on three lots and a note for
50,000 dollars payable on demand and bearing no interest. When later
B received a deed to the three lots, he sought a declaration that the
deed was a valid conveyance, or in the alternative, of foreclosure if
the deed were found to have been given for security. This claim was
resisted on the ground that both the mortgage and deed were invalid
transfers within the meaning of the statute. Although the court found,
that the financial condition of D Corporation was such that the statute
prohibited a transfer to an officer for an antecedent debt, it held that
the obligation was not an antecedent debt within the meaning of the
statute and that the deed was given for a sufficient consideration.
The third case 6 involving the statute underscores the principle that
any gift of or excess over the fair market value of property conveyed
34. Jasson D. Radding, Inc. v. Coulter, 138 So.2d 380 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
35. Blackwelder v. D'Ercole Enterprises, Inc., 148 So.2d 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
36. Garnett v. General Contractors & Builder's, Inc., 145 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
19641
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by an insolvent corporation to one of its officers represents a preference
which the officer is required to repay to the corporation for the benefit
of its creditors.
A related question is presented when preferential dividends are paid
by a solvent corporation to a majority stockholder, to the exclusion of
the remaining stockholders who do not ratify the transaction. Such was
the situation presented in the case of Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank oJ
Miami."' Although acknowledging the general rule that dividends are
not normally recoverable from stockholders once they are paid to
them, the court correctly held the rule inapplicable when the stockholder
received dividends which he knew were not paid pro rata to all stock-
holders.
3. PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION ACT
At its 1961 session, the Florida legislature enacted the Professional
Service Corporation Act, 8 the central purpose of which was to enable
professional men to incorporate for the practice of their professions.
Previously, professional and other self-employed groups were not per-
mitted to incorporate, but in 1954 the Internal Revenue Code was
amended to permit an employer to establish a pension fund for the
benefit of his employees. The amendment provides that payments by
the employer into the fund are deductible from his gross income. More-
over, payments to the employee do not subject him to income tax lia-
bility until actual receipt of the pension at a later date.39
Since its enactment cases construing this statute have involved at-
torneys,4° accountants and appraisers.4" In holding that members of
the Florida Bar may practice law as a corporate entity under the
statute, the supreme court of Florida was careful to point out that "such
approval is not to be construed as an intention to eliminate any of their
obligations as individuals to meet the requirements of the Integration
Rule and the Rules and Canons of Ethics."4 3 With respect to account-
ants, a rule of the state board of accountancy prohibiting certified public
accountants or public accountants from being officers, directors, stock-
holders, representatives or agents of corporations engaged in the prac-
tice of public accounting was held to be null and void because in conflict
37. 136 So.2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). Actually, through the use of consolidated in-
come tax returns, gains of a subsidiary corporation were transferred to the parent corpora-
tion, but the court treated these payments as "dividends." Id. at 660.
38. FLA. STAT. ch. 621 (1963).
39. 26 U.S.C. §§ 31-37 (1959). For a detailed discussion of the act, see Buchmann &
Bearden, The Professional Service Corporation-A New Business Entity, 16 U. MIAMi L.
REv. 1 (1961).
40. In the Matter of the Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
41. State Bd. of Accountancy v. Eber, 149 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
42. Parker v. Panama City, 151 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
43. In the Matter of the Florida Bar, supra note 40, at 557.
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with the Professional Service Corporation Act.44 Similarly, in Parker v.
Panama City,45 it was held that the legislative intent in enacting the
statute was clearly to the effect that persons licensed as appraisers may
incorporate and contract to render professional services.
4. DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND AGENTS
It is a familiar principle of corporation law that knowledge acquired
by officers or agents of a corporation while acting for the corporation
may be imputed to the corporation. Thus, in a recent case a corpora-
tion was held liable for negotiations entered into by its general manager
when other officers of the corporation were present during the nego-
tiations and failed to repudiate his actions.46 Similarly, when a corpora-
tion which financed the first purchase of an automobile repossessed and
resold it to a dealer and then financed the second saleof the automobile,
which the dealer falsely represented to the plaintiffs to be new, the
corporation was charged with knowledge of the misrepresentation.4 7
The question of the liability of persons acting for corporations is
governed by the general rule that a promoter is personally liable on
contracts entered into by him on behalf of the corporation prior to its
incorporation. Thus, in Katz v. Kenholtz, 48 a promoter was held per-
sonally liable as a party to a lease executed by him on behalf of a
corporation which was not incorporated until five months later.
In another recent case, compensation was denied to an officer of
a corporation who had no prescribed duties and who in fact never per-
formed any duties, on the familiar principle that such payment by the
corporation would amount to no more than a gift.
49
5. SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS
An interesting case5" recently decided by the Second District Court
of Appeal involved the jurisdiction of state courts with respect to
building and loan associations organized under the Federal Home
Owners' Loan Act. The court held that since the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board had adopted comprehensive rules and regulations govern-
ing the appointment of receivers and the calling of special meetings of
the members of a federal building and loan association, the state courts
had no jurisdiction in such matters. However, the court also held that
44. State Bd. of Accountancy v. Eber, supra note 41.
45. 151 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
46. Dade County Dairies, Inc. v. Projected Planning Co., 158 So.2d 565 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
47. Brown v. Cahill, 157 So.2d 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
48. 147 So.2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
49. Binz v. Helvetia Fla. Enterprises, 156 So.2d 703 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
50. Pearson v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Tarpon Springs, 149 So.2d 891 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1963).
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the federal authorities have not pre-empted the field and that the state
courts have jurisdiction to invalidate proxies of federal building and
loan association members, in the absence of federal provisions per-
taining to the validity of proxies.
In James Talcott, Inc. v. McDowell,"' the court succinctly discussed
the nature of a stockholder's derivative action, and correctly held that
a complaint failed to state a cause of action for failing to allege: (1)
that the corporation's refusal to sue was wrongful; and (2) the reasons
for the refusal.
Section 17 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Law52 provides, in effect,
that a restriction on the transfer of shares is invalid unless the restriction
(or a proper reference to it) is stated upon the stock certificate. In Gen-
eral Dev. Corp. v. Catlin,"5 C, an employee of D Corporation, entered
into a stock option agreement with the corporation. By the terms of
this agreement, C represented that if he were to exercise the option he
would acquire the stock for investment and not with a view to distribu-
tion. Subsequently, C gave notice of his desire to exercise the option,
but D Corporation refused to deliver the stock without a restrictive
legend on the stock certificate. C sued, alleging that he was entitled to
receive the stock without the legend. The court correctly held that the
aforementioned statute affected the obligations of C's contract, became
a part of it, and that the stock certificate should be restricted ac-
cordingly. While not mentioned in the opinion, the real fear of D Corpo-
ration, of course, was that a resale of the shares by C would destroy
the private offering exemption contained in the second clause of section
4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, thereby placing the corporation in
violation of the registration and prospectus provisions of that act.
54
6. DISSOLUTION AND RESTORATION
Section 608.35 of Florida's corporate code provides that a cor-
poration which fails to comply with the reporting and capital stock
tax requirements for six months shall not be permitted to maintain or
defend any action in a Florida court until such reports are filed and
the taxes paid. A recent case55 properly held that a corporation was
not barred from maintaining an action by its failure to make reports
and pay the capital stock tax, when such taxes were paid and the reports
51. 148 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
52. FLA. STAT. § 614.17 (1963).
53. 139 So.2d 901 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
54. Query: Was C legally entitled to the option or the stock in the first place, in view
of Florida's blue sky law? See FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1963). That statute contains no exemp-
tion for sales of securities to employees. Accordingly, in the absence of registration under the
Florida blue sky law, if C was a Florida resident and not already a stockholder of D
Corporation, no exemption would seem to be available.
55. American Land Dev. Corp. v. Hillman, 138 So.2d 756 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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were filed prior to the court's decision on the defendant's motion to
dismiss on those grounds.
In another recent case56 the president of a corporation executed a
lease on its behalf after the corporation had been dissolved for failure
to pay its capital stock taxes. Subsequently, the taxes were paid and
the corporation's permit to do business was restored pursuant to a
governing statute."7 The president was held not to be personally liable
under the lease, on the ground that the payment of the delinquent taxes
had the effect of ratifying and confirming the lease as though the cor-
poration was not delinquent on the date of its execution. This'decision
is in line with the generally accepted view that statutes providing for
dissolution and restoration, when complied with, restore the corpora-;
tion as though it had never been dissolved and validate acts performed
during the interim period.58
II. SECUlRITIES REGULATION
A. Recent Legislation
A major point of departure between the Federal Securities Act of
1933 and most of the state "Blue Sky" laws is the fact that the basic
philosophy of the 1933 act is one of full disclosure, while that of the
majority of the latter acts is one of examination of the merits of the
securities proposed to be offered to the public. In short, the 1933 act
is a "truth in securities" law designed to protect investors against mis-
representation and fraud in the offer and sale of securities. But as long
as the whole truth is told, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the body charged with the duty of administering the 1933 act, is power-
less to pass upon the merits of securities proposed to be offered to the
public. On the other hand, many state securities commissions, including
that of Florida, do pass upon the merits of securities proposed to be
offered to their residents. From this fact has stemmed an incorrect
(but perhaps understandable) belief on the part of many investors that
a proposed issue "cleared" by the Florida Securities Commission has
obtained the stamp of approval of that Commission and thus is some-
how "safe." Nothing could be further from the truth. Although the
Florida Securities Act does set up certain standards as conditions prece-
dent to registration of securities in Florida, 9 and although the Florida
Securities Commission does pass upon the merits of securities proposed
to be offered, in the light of those statutory norms, favorable action
56. Spector v. Hart, 139 So.2d 923 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
57. FLA. STAT. § 608.37 (1963).
58. See Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1220 (1950).
59. FLA. STAT. § 517.09(7) (1963) allows the sale of a security if the registrant can
demonstrate that the sale would not work or tend to work a fraud on the-purchaser, that the
terms of the sale would be fair, just and equitable, and that the issuer's business or enter-
prise is not based upon unsound business principles.
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by the Commission does not by any means constitute its recommenda-
tion or approval. A 1963 amendment" to the Florida Securities Act makes
unlawful any representation to the contrary.
Other new provisions added in 1963 include: (1) the granting of
power to the court to appoint receivers at the request of the Commission
as an aid in the enforcement of injunctive Orders;" (2) the deletion of
the sale of insured mortgages from the list of exempt transactions and
the addition of the requirement of a $25 fee to accompany notice of
certain exempt transactions; 62 (3) the deletion of provision for notice
by registered dealers of their intention to sell registered securities; (4)
authorization of the suspension of certain dealers' and salesmen's regis-
trations;13 and (5) authorization for destruction of certain records by
the Commission after such records have been photographed. 4
A welcome innovation is the publication, in printed form, of the
Commission's rules and regulations.6" Heretofore, these rules and regu-
lations had been mimeographed and distributed sporadically. Their
collection in a single pamphlet will be of considerable assistance to
attorneys.
B. Recent Cases
The Florida Securities Act requires registration of securities which
are publicly offered for sale, but exempts certain transactions from
registration. 6 In Hammond v. State6" defendant was convicted of the
felonious sale of unregistered securities, the trial court holding as a
matter of law that there was no exemption available. On appeal this
holding was reversed, on the ground that the question of the availability
of the exemption was one for the jury.
In State v. Smith, 8 a case of first impression in Florida, the
question was presented whether scienter is a necessary element for es-
tablishing a violation of the Florida Securities Act. The defendant was
prosecuted for the unlawful sale of registered securities, but the indict-
ment did not allege scienter. The statute does not specify scienter as
an element of the crime, but the court held that the indictment was
fatally defective, on the ground that scienter is "an implied element of
the crime which must be averred and proven .... ,,69
60. FLA. STAT. § 517.311 (1963). Representations by brokers or dealers that registration
spells Commission approval are also made unlawful.
61. FLA. STAT. § 517.19(7) (1963).
62. FLA. STAT. § 517.06 (1963).
63. FLA. STAT. § 517.16 (1963).
64. FLA. STAT. § 517.33 (1963).
65. Rules and Regulations, Fla. Sec. Comm. (Nov. 1962).
66. FLA. STAT. § 517.06 (1963).
67. 151 So.2d 872 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
68. 151 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
69. Id. at 891.
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In Harrison v. McCourtney,7 ° the plaintiffs participated in and had
knowledge of the violation alleged in the complaint; the defendant's
answer, therefore, quite naturally raised the affirmative defense of es-
toppel. The court held that in an action based on a violation of the
statute, estoppel may be a defense, thus creating a genuine issue of
fact precluding a summary judgment. However, the affirmative defense
of estoppel may be overcome if the plaintiff shows that he lacks sufficient
control over a contact with the issuer of the stock.
71
70. 148 So.2d 53 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). See also Popper v. Havana Publications, Inc., 122
So.2d 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
71. Monroe v. Dixon, 152 So.2d 744 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
